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Mahsud Blockade (1900–02)
Source: https://archive.org/details/campaignsonnorth00nevi/page/324 Background After the restoration of peace in 1898 the Mahsud Waziris were the only tribe who disturbed the tran- quiUity of the North- West Frontier of India during a period of ten years. The marauding prodivities of the Mahsuds have already been noticed in previous chapters — in fact, the members of this tribe appear to be a people who court publicity, for they have never permitted them- selves to sink into unconsidered obscurity since they first came in contact with the British Government. Between 1898 and 1900 Mahsud raids rendered life and property in the Tochi and Gomal Valleys so insecure, and the perpetrators of these outrages established such a terrorism over not only the inhabitants of British villages, but many of the native officials as well, that retaliatory measures became absolutely necessary. The following extracts from a report by the Assistant Com- missioner of the North-West Frontier Province,* dated February i, 1902, give a good idea of the attitude of the Mahsuds during 1899-1900: "It would, of course, be an exaggeration to say that the Mahsuds ever attempted directly to intimidate British officers ; they were far too clever for this. But they actually did mtimidate superior native officials. Bhanju Lai, Tahsildar, told me that on one occasion during the hearing of a case in his court a Mahsud deputation had commenced with petitions, and proceeded to direct threats regarding his decision of the case. Karimdad . . . who was deputed to superintend the demolition of a tower illegally erected by Futteh Khan . . . went long afterwards in fear of Futteh Khan's * Mr. P. Pipon. 325 326 THE MAHSUD BLOCKADE, 19OO-1902 revenge. A notorious raider . . . was got in, and Deputy- Inspector Thana Ram let him go rather than remand him to custody. " Practically no cases under the Arms Act were ever sent up from the Gomal Thana. Notwithstanding this, I believe armed Mahsuds were everywhere. I was con- firmed in this view by an incident in November, 1899, when I happened to be riding to Murtaza at a time when tongas do not ordinarily pass. I met a Mahsud carrying a gun down the highroad in broad daylight. He was arrested, proved to be a well-known badmash, and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. I do not believe for a moment that had the police in any way attempted to enforce the Act against Mahsuds such an occurrence would be possible. Indeed, before the begin- ning of 1899, the Arms Act seems not to have been enforced at all against Mahsuds. ***** " The Border Military Police were useless from fear. During these two years, so far as I know, not one Mahsud was ever killed or even wounded by the Border Military Police. ... It was well known that no Border Military Police sepoy would ever shoot a Mahsud. He would fire, but be careful to miss. " It was a generally recognized fact that the Mahsuds had become more and more dangerous of late years. I have had many conversations with our own maliks on the subject, and they attributed the fact to their receiving large allowances with which to buy rifles, to the disarma- ment of British subjects, to the invariable consideration shown to Mahsuds of all classes in British territory, and to the Mahsud colony. The last-named scheme gave every Mahsud badmash an explanation for his presence,, afforded a perfect rendezvous for raiding gangs, and a handy repository for arms and stolen property. ... It was as a Gundaspur Khan dryl}^ described it, 'a school of badmashi opened by Government for the instruction of our young men.' ***** " Two cases were brought before me in which the Hindu shopkeepers had rushed off to the police, but on being confronted with the Mahsud prisoner in court refused to open their mouths against them, evidently in abject fear. LAXITY OF DISCIPLINE 327 " When I first came to Tank even the chaprasis used to announce that a Mahsud was waiting, in a manner which showed that all other work, however important, was to be thrown to the winds. When I refused to let Mahsuds interrupt the court on all occasions, they com- plained on the subject to the Political Officer." In view of the state of affairs disclosed by the foregoing extracts, it is not surprising that outrages of all kinds were of frequent occurrence. It must be admitted, however, that in most of the cases in which troops or police were concerned, and the Mahsuds scored a distinct success, this result was due to want of vigilance, or the neglect of some ordinary precaution. On the night of January 9 and 10, 1900, a band of Mahsuds entered the Zam police post, the door of which was open, killed six men, and carried off seven firearms. On August 27, 1901, a tonga carrying four passengers, travelling after sunset contrary to orders, was ambuscaded near Murtaza, and one man was wounded. Again, on June 18, 1901, a party of Mahsuds sent a man forward to reconnoitre the police post at Baran. The man entered the fort on the pretext of asking for a drink of water, satisfied himself as to the laxity of discipline, and returned to his companions. When the raiders advanced against the post an hour later, shortly before noon, the sentry was absent from his post, and with regard to the remainder of the garrison it is said that *' it consisted of twenty-two men and a dafadar, of whom eleven were absent either on duty, without leave, or in gaol, leaving eleven men and the dafadar in the post. The whole of these men appear to have displayed the most con- temptible negligence and cowardice, and their statements as to what occurred are so tinctured with puerile exaggeration and desire to save themselves as to be practically worthless. . . . Finding the wicket gate open, the raiders rushed in and surprised the entire guard — asleep or engaged in music. These men allowed them- selves to be overpowered, without a shot being fired or even a loud cry being raised. The raiders then took from the dafadar his keys, and proceeded to collect the garrison. During the confusion the dafadar managed to slip out of the gate and get away. Had he gone straight to the nearest village much might have been done, but he seems to have gone mad with fear, and probably hid himself in a ravine till the gang were well away. The 328 THE MAHSUD BLOCKADE, 19OO-1902 rest of the garrison were collected by the raiders, and driven into a room in the post the door of which was padlocked."* fifteen firearms, seven bayonets, and 548 rounds of ammunition were carried off by the Mahsuds. Yet another instance occurred near Murtaza on Novem- ber 3, 1901, when the escort to a survey party neglected to take proper military precautions on its return march, was ambushed in a ravine at short range, and half their number were killed. In November, 1900, the unpaid fines due from the Mahsuds on account of various raids amounted to nearly 2 lakhs of rupees.f There seemed to be no prospect of settlement, and the general situation had become so intolerable that the tribesmen were informed that Rs. 50,000 must be paid by the end of the month, or a blockade of their country would be begun. No satis- factory reply being received, the Mahsuds were therefore cut off from intercourse with the outside world with effect from December i, 1900, by means of a chain of police posts, supported by movable columns of regular troops. During the next six months part of the fine imposed was paid, but, as fresh outrages were committed entailing further claims for compensation, it was recog- nized that the effect of the passive blockade would have to be intensified by more active measures. Accordingly mobile columns were organized at Datta Khel, Jandola, Sarwakai, and Wana to carry the war into the enemy's country by means of rapidly executed counter-raids. These operations were conducted under the direction of Major-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., who had the troops named below at his disposal. ist Punjab Cavalry. 5th Punjab Cavalry. Gujrat Mountain IBattery (27th Mountain Battery), ist Punjab Infantry. 2nd Punjab Infantry. 32nd Pioneers. 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. 45th Sikhs. 9th Bombay Infantry). Infantry (109th 3rd Sikhs. 17th Bengal Infantry. 23rd Pioneers. 27th Punjab Infantry. 28th Punjab Infantry. 2gth Punjab Infantry. 23rd Bombay Infantry (123rd Outram's Rifles). 24th Bombay Infantry (124th Baluchistan Infantry). North Waziristan Militia. South Waziristan Militia. * Report by the Deputy-Commissioner of Bannu, dated August 2, 1901. t Rs. 200,000 = ;^i3,333. THE END OF THE BLOCKADE 329 There were four series of raids at intervals of about a fortnight, beginning on November 23, 1901, during which many villages were destroyed, nearly 400 Mahsuds were killed or wounded, others captured, and a large number of cattle driven off; the British casualties amounted to 146. Some sharp fighting occurred now and then, but the troops were well handled, and the result of these operations was that within forty-five days the Mahsuds had made their submission, and the blockade was raised on March 10, 1902. Before the end of 1902 an expedition had to be under- taken against the Kabul Khel Waziris under Major- General C. C. Egerton, C.B, The troops operated in four columns, formed from the troops named below, and after taking some 300 prisoners, destroying hostile villages and fortifications, and capturing over 5,000 head of cattle, returned to Bannu in eight days, having met with but little opposition. ist Punjab Cavalry. 3rd Punjab Cavalry. 5th Punjab Cavalry. Kohat Mountain Battery. Derajat Mountain Battery. Gujrat Mountain Battery, 2nd Punjab Infantry. 4th Punjab Infantry. 5th Punjab Infantry. 22nd Punjab Infantry. ist Sikh Infantry. 3rd Sikh Infantry. 4th Sikh Infantry. Kurram Militia. North Waziristan Militia. Since 1902 Mahsud raids have not ceased; from time to time the news of some such escapade reaches the newspapers of India and the mother country, and serves to remind their readers that the military history of Waziristan is not closed yet, but may require an addition at no very distant date. The story of the Mahsud blockade is interesting from a political rather than a military point of view. It furnishes striking evidence of the truth of the assertion that war is after all the surest instrument of diplomacy. Six weeks of active operations procured the submission of the refractory tribe after twelve months of passive blockade had failed to produce any important result, in spite of the strategical facilities afforded to the Indian Government by the occupation of the Tochi and Gomal Valleys. The question of cost and the well-known difficulty of obtaining decisive results among the rugged mountain fastnesses of Mahsud terri- tory appear to have been the chief objections to active military operations in the first instance, but neither of 330 THE MAHSUD BLOCKADE, igoo-1902 these was justified by events. Not only had a large force to be employed eventually, but the enemy's territory was successfully penetrated from several directions, and considerable loss inflicted on the fighting strength of the tribe. Military operations which are not recognized officially as part of a regular campaign are always unsatisfactory to the troops engaged. The risks and hardships in- cidental to an expedition, a blockade, or a mission on the Indian frontier, are practically identical, but not so the compensations. In the case of the Mahsud blockade the size of the force employed, the hard marching, the sharp fighting on some occasions, and the important results achieved in a short time, undoubtedly entitle the record of the services rendered by the troops to a place among those of the recognized frontier campaigns.